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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND SEARCHES INCIDENT TO 
ARREST IN NEW YORK:  
THE DIFFICULTIES AND DISTINCTIONS  
Kyle Knox* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.1   
The right to be free in one’s person, home and belongings from 
unwarranted governmental intrusions has been a tradition in our nation 
since its inception and finds its roots in the English common law.2  
Moreover, most states have similar provisions in their state 
constitutions to ensure the security of their citizenry with near identical 
language to the Fourth Amendment.3 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; State University of 
New York at Plattsburgh, M.S.T., in Adolescence Education, B.A., in History, 2015.  I would 
like to thank my parents for their constant support and love throughout my life, especially 
during law school.  Additionally, I would like to thank my girlfriend for motivating and 
encouraging me to become the best lawyer I can be.  Finally, I would like to thank the 
Honorable Mark Cohen for introducing me to the vast realm of criminal procedure, and 
Professor Gary Shaw for providing his valuable insight as a writer and a constitutional law 
scholar to me, and constantly challenging me as I wrote this article along the way. 
1  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 See Semayne’s Case (1604), 77 Eng. Rep. 194; 5 Coke Rep. 91; Entick v. Carrington 
(1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029. 
3 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The 
1
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The New York Constitution has followed the language 
provided by the Fourth Amendment to the very last word.4  The Fourth 
Amendment and New York Constitution article I, section 12, both 
provide that, ordinarily, for a search to be considered reasonable, there 
must be a warrant, signed by a neutral and detached magistrate, in the 
possession of the police at the time they conduct the search.5  The 
warrant must establish probable cause to conduct the search or seizure.6  
Should the police not have a warrant in their possession at the time of 
the search or seizure, there is a possibility that the search will be 
considered unreasonable and trigger the Exclusionary Rule.7  The 
Exclusionary Rule provides that if police seize evidence in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, a court will exclude that evidence from being 
introduced in a criminal trial against the person whose Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated.8   
While warrants are generally required for a police officer to 
search a person or thing for evidence and even further to seize such 
evidence, there are circumstances in which a police officer is not 
required to provide a warrant before making such search or seizure.9  
In other words, the lack of a warrant at the time of the search or seizure 
is excused.  Several exceptions to the warrant requirement have been 
upheld in both federal courts and New York State courts.10  Two of 
 
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable 
seizures or searches . . . .”). 
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
7 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185 
(6th ed. 2013). 
8 Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that such evidence cannot 
be introduced in federal prosecutions against a criminal defendant); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) (holding that such evidence cannot be introduced in state prosecutions), with 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (holding that illegally seized evidence may be 
introduced to impeach the criminal defendant’s credibility for trustworthiness).  
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
10 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (recognizing that there is an 
“automobile exception” to the warrant requirement where a police officer possesses probable 
cause to believe that the driver of such vehicle is transporting illegal substances); People v. 
Langen, 456 N.E.2d 1167 (N.Y. 1983) (same); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
2
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these exceptions, in particular, are searches incident to lawful arrest11 
(SILA) and exigent circumstances.12 
Before going any further, there must be an explanation as to the 
warrantless exceptions that are to be the main foci of this Note, those 
being searches incident to lawful arrest and exigent circumstances.  
First, a search incident to lawful arrest occurs when “[a] police officer 
who makes a lawful custodial arrest . . . conduct[s] a contemporaneous 
warrantless search of: (1) the arrestee’s person; and (2) the area within 
the arrestee’s immediate control.”13  The Supreme Court justified the 
search incident to arrest exception in Chimel v. California14 by 
recognizing the risks that an officer confronts when arresting a 
suspect.15  Academic writers say that the justification for the search 
without a warrant is that “the right of an officer to search the person of 
the arrestee and the area within his immediate control for weapons and 
evidence . . . flows automatically from the arrest itself.”16  In the course 
of the search, after the arrest has been made, the officer may then seize 
“any article discovered during a lawful SILA search, even if it relates 
to a crime unrelated to the arrest, but only if the officer has probable 
cause to believe the object constitutes constitutionally seizeable 
evidence . . . .”17  This exception is so widely accepted in federal 
jurisprudence that in United States v. Robinson,18 Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, wrote that “in the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest a full search of a person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ 
 
(1973) (holding that a search warrant is not required where a person gives the police officer 
consent to search); People v. Singleteary, 324 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1974) (same). 
11 Weeks, 414 U.S. at 391-92; see People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583 (N.Y. 1923).  
12 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 
1976), abrogated on other grounds by Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
13 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 185 (footnotes omitted). 
14 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
15 Id. at 762-63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search 
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order 
to resist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, 
and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction.  And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A gun on a table or in a drawer 
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in 
the clothing of the person arrested.”). 
16 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 186 (citation omitted). 
17 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 187 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
18 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
3
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search under that Amendment.”19  The inherent exigencies of the arrest 
situation justify the search of the person,20 containers and controllable 
area,21 and the vehicle.22 
Second, exigent circumstances are situations, more 
appropriately termed “emergencies,” in which “time constraints make 
it impracticable for the officer to seek a warrant.”23  For an officer to 
justify a warrantless search under exigent circumstances, the police 
officer must have a reasonable belief that a criminal suspect is going 
to escape or that evidence will be lost or destroyed.24  For example, if 
a criminal suspect begins to flee from an otherwise lawful police 
encounter, the officer is entitled to give chase of the suspect in order 
to prevent their escape.25  This is known as “hot pursuit.”26  
Additionally, exigency requires a cursory limitation on the scope of the 
search.27  For example, in the case of a protective sweep, the cursory 
limitation is that the police are entitled to conduct a protective sweep 
to discover a person who may pose a danger, but only in areas where 
they reasonably believe a person is hiding, or realistically could be 
hiding.28  Furthermore, the exigency exception lasts no longer than the 
exigency exists.29  For example, if the police possess an arrest warrant 
for D, then go to D’s house, find him, and arrest him, they cannot use 
exigent circumstances as a justification to search the entire house for 
another person, B, as the exigency ended when D was arrested.30  
Finally, the exception does not apply if the police “create the exigency 
by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment.”31 
 
19 Id. at 235. 
20 Id. at 226, 236. 
21 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 768 (1969). 
22 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton 
and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.” (emphasis added)).  
23 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 179. 
24 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 179. 
25 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). 
26 Id. 
27 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 179. 
28 See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
29 Id. at 335-36. 
30 See id. at 332-33.  
31 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011).  
4
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So, with that understanding, the Supreme Court has found that 
the reason that searches incident to arrest of a person or a container 
within the controllable area are valid searches under the Fourth 
Amendment is derived from the inherent exigencies that are present at 
the time of the arrest.  For many years, New York had followed this 
basic principle regarding the search of the “person.”32  However, the 
landscape of warrantless searches in New York changed drastically in 
1983. 
In 1983, the Court of Appeals of New York decided the case of 
People v. Gokey,33 where the court held that “[u]nder the State 
Constitution, an individual’s right of privacy in his or her effects 
dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest be deemed 
unreasonable unless justified by the presence of exigent 
circumstances.”34  This holding represents a drastic departure from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson such that New York has 
essentially rejected the entire reasoning of the Robinson court’s 
conclusions of law with regard to searches incident to arrest.  This is a 
departure because the whole reasoning behind justifying searches 
incident to arrest of containers within the immediate control of an 
arrestee is predicated on the belief that the arrestee may possess 
weapons that might pose a danger to the officer or evidence that might 
be lost.35  The added layer of exigency requires that when an officer 
has probable cause to arrest someone, they must have a reasonable 
belief that the container to be searched possesses a weapon or 
destructible evidence.  Chimel implies that this notion is to be 
assumed.36  In other words, if there are no exigent circumstances, the 
police must obtain a search warrant for the container found within the 
controllable area of an arrestee.  
It only harms society to sustain this rule.  The problem is not 
that the police are performing a wanton search for objects based on 
something less than is required to make an arrest.  What is happening 
here is that even in the event that the police possess probable cause to 
make an arrest, they must possess something more than probable cause 
to make the arrest when they search the backpack on that person’s 
person during the arrest.   
 
32 People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (N.Y. 1923). 
33 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983).  
34 Id. at 724. 
35 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
36 Id. 
5
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In the years after the Gokey decision, it seems that the courts of 
New York have engaged in a string of misapplications of the Gokey 
rule, leading to inconsistent results that, as a policy consideration, can 
only be remedied by an overturning of the Gokey rule or a change to 
the New York Criminal Procedure Law through legislation.  
This Note’s focus is on exigency and searches incident to arrest 
for the following reason: In New York, in order to justify a search 
incident to arrest of a suspect’s container within their immediate 
control, the search cannot be “divorced in time or place from the 
arrest,” and the search must be justified under exigent circumstances.37  
In other words, New York requires that a warrant exception must be 
evident to justify another warrant exception.  While it is true that the 
states can provide more liberty guarantees to their citizens than the 
federal government, the states must balance the liberty interests of their 
citizens against the interests of law enforcement when dealing with 
search and seizure issues, particularly the interests of crime prevention 
and public safety. 
Therefore, this Note will discuss the following: Part II of this 
Note will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Robinson and how the Court came to its conclusion.  Part III will 
discuss People v. Smith and People v. Gokey, the relationship between 
the two cases, and a policy consideration for choosing Smith over 
Gokey as New York’s search incident to arrest standard.  Part IV will 
discuss how courts in New York have been inconsistently applying the 
Gokey rationale and coming to differing results.  Finally, Part V will 
conclude with the remedies that the Court of Appeals or the legislature 
should undertake in order to eliminate the inconsistency.   
II. UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON 
On April 23, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks of the D.C. 
Metropolitan Police noticed the defendant driving a vehicle.38  Officer 
Jenks knew that, based on a check that he had done four days earlier 
of the defendant’s driver’s permit, the defendant was driving with a 
revoked permit.39  Officer Jenks signaled for the car to pull over, which 
the defendant did, and then the defendant and two other individuals got 
 
37 People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983). 
38 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1972). 
39 Id. 
6
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out of the vehicle.40  Jenks informed the defendant that he was under 
arrest for “operating after revocation and obtaining a permit by false 
pretenses.”41 
After conducting a full-custody arrest of the defendant, Jenks 
began to search the defendant by patting him down, which Jenks was 
required to do by the procedures of his police department.42  The 
procedures were in place “[p]rimarily, for [the officer’s] own safety 
and, secondly, for the safety of the individual he has placed under 
arrest and, thirdly, to search for evidence of the crime.”43  Upon 
touching the defendant’s left breast, Jenks felt an object inside of the 
chest pocket of the defendant’s jacket.44  He then pulled out the object, 
which turned out to be a crumpled-up cigarette box.45  Officer Jenks 
testified that “[a]s I felt the package I could feel objects in the package, 
but I couldn’t tell what they were . . . I knew they weren’t cigarettes.”46  
Jenks opened the cigarette box and found 14 gelatin capsules 
containing a white substance, which, after further examination, was 
heroin.47 
The defendant was convicted in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia of the possession and facilitation of 
concealment of heroin.48  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel 
reversed his conviction on the basis that the search was a protective 
frisk, rather than a full search of the person, which meant that the 
officer was not entitled to seize the cigarette box and open it without a 
warrant because a frisk is used to find weapons that the officer 
reasonably believes exist and fears for.49  In this case, the D.C. Circuit 
found that the officer would not have been able to find fruits of the 
arrest violation on the person of the defendant; thus the officer would 
have been allowed to only perform a protective frisk.50 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 221-23. 
43 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.2 (alteration in original).  
44 Id. at 223. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (alteration in original). 
47 Id. 
48 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 219. 
49 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
50 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233. 
7
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The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the 
decision of the D.C. Circuit.51  In short, the Court in Robinson found 
that the D.C. Circuit misapplied the stop-and-frisk rule in this case 
because Jenk’s search of the defendant was not based on reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant might be engaging in crime, but rather the 
defendant had in fact engaged in a crime for which the officer had 
probable cause to arrest.52  The crux of the case was that the Robinson 
Court found that the search incident to arrest of the cigarette pack 
found on the defendant’s person was justified as a reasonable search, 
entirely separate from the need to have a warrant exception: 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm 
and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a 
court may later decide was the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause 
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; 
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact 
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to 
search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.53 
In one sweep, the Supreme Court deemed a search incident to 
lawful arrest as not an exception to the warrant requirement but rather 
“a reasonable search.”54  However, the Court in Robinson made several 
mentions of “the person,” but not “the container,” being the thing that 
is searched.55  One may argue then that, because the Supreme Court 
does not explicitly mention “the area within the arrestee’s immediate 
control,” containers found in such area are not subject to the same rule.   
 
51 Id. at 224. 
52 Id. at 227-28. 
53 Id. at 235.  
54 Id. 
55 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226-28, 235. 
8
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This argument, however, is misplaced because the evidence at 
issue in Robinson was found within a cigarette pack on the defendant’s 
person.  It would be difficult for one to claim that an object found 
within a person’s pocket is not “in the area of immediate control.”  
Furthermore, a “container” is defined as “[t]hat which contains; a 
vessel, receptacle, carton, case, or other containing or enclosing 
structure.”56  A cigarette pack found in a person’s pocket at the time of 
the arrest clearly meets the definition of a “container.”  An “arrest” is 
defined as “(1) a seizure or forcible restraint, especially by authority,” 
or “(2) the taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal authority, 
especially in response to a criminal charge; specifically the 
apprehension of someone for the purpose of securing the 
administration of the law, especially bringing that person before a 
court.”57  Finally, a “seizure,” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, means that a person’s freedom of movement has been 
restrained by means of physical force or show of authority (e.g., 
displaying of a gun).58 
Therefore, the Robinson holding establishes that where a police 
officer seizes a person, and he has probable cause to perform such 
seizure, he is entitled to search the person and the person’s belongings 
that are in the area of the arrestee’s immediate control, and such search 
is reasonable.59 
The next question, however, is this: how did the Court 
determine that the search incident to arrest of the container is per se 
“reasonable”?  Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, in order to 
determine whether a search is “reasonable,” a court must make a 
determination as to whether the suspect possessed a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in the thing that was the object of the search.60  
If such person did possess a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
such thing, and the police search it without a warrant, then the search 
is considered “unreasonable” and will not stand, unless it is justified 
by a warrant exception.61 
 
56 Container, THE WEBSTER’S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 219 (1974). 
57 Arrest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
58 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
59 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.  
60 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
61 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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Based on the Katz rationale, the Supreme Court in Robinson 
effectively determined that the search of a container found within the 
arrestee’s immediate control is a reasonable search because, after the 
arrest had been made, the suspect had a reduced expectation of privacy 
in his belongings.62  This “reduced expectation” is seemingly based on 
the belief that, once the arrest had been made, the search of the person 
and any container found within the arrestee’s immediate control is a de 
minimis intrusion.63  In other words, because the ultimate seizure, the 
arrest, had already been justified based on probable cause, the search 
afterwards was trivial or inconsequential.  
To this day, Robinson is still the leading authority under federal 
law to justify searches incident to arrest, either of the person or a 
container.  However, New York chose a different route with regard to 
searches of containers. 
III. ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE V. SMITH AND PEOPLE V. GOKEY 
We begin this Part with the understanding that, under New 
York law, to justify a search incident to lawful arrest of a container 
found within the arrestee’s immediate control, the police must possess 
exigent circumstances.64  However, the two cases that created this rule, 
which other courts have recently relied on,65 are somewhat at odds with 
each other.  This Part will provide a review of both People v. Smith 
and People v. Gokey, and then analyze the distinctions between the 
two, to determine which case is the better approach for analyzing 
searches incident to arrest. 
A. People v. Smith 
In People v. Smith, the police encountered a suspect who had 
jumped a turnstile.66  As they were inquiring with the suspect as to why 
he jumped the turnstile, the police noticed that the defendant was 
 
62 Id.; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226. 
63 See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) (holding that where a 
police officer has probable cause to stop a vehicle on the side of the road, the additional step 
of the officer in asking the driver of the vehicle to step out so that the officer can make 
additional observations and inquiries is a de minimis intrusion).  
64 People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983); People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 
724 (N.Y. 1983). 
65 See People v. Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d 831 (N.Y. 2014).  
66 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1225. 
10
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wearing a bulletproof vest.67  When the defendant was asked if he was 
wearing such a vest, the defendant denied that he was wearing one.68  
Thereafter, one officer drew his gun, arrested the defendant, and 
moved him 10 feet away from the location of the arrest.69  Another 
officer took the briefcase that the defendant was carrying, opened it, 
and found a .38 caliber revolver inside.70 
The Supreme Court of New York County found that New York 
v. Belton71 and United States v. Chadwick72 controlled the case, and 
found that the weapon should be suppressed because the police “had 
exclusive control of the briefcase.”73  The Court of Appeals disagreed 
on two separate grounds.74  First, the Court of Appeals completely 
ignored the argument made by the defendant that Belton and Chadwick 
only applied to the automobile context, finding that those cases, 
specifically Belton, allowed an extended search of containers found 
within the grabbable area of an arrestee.75  Secondly, the Court of 
Appeals found that, for a search incident to arrest of a container found 
within the arrestee’s controllable area to be valid, the search after the 
arrest must have been “not significantly divorced in time or place from 
the arrest,” and there needed to be exigent circumstances.76 
During its analysis, the Court of Appeals distinguished its 
interpretation of the New York Constitution against the way in which 
the Supreme Court interprets the United States Constitution by 
discussing a utilization of the totality of the circumstances rather than 
establishing bright-line rules of law.77  Regarding the safety of the 
police officers, the Court of Appeals found that the officers reasonably 
believed that the defendant had access to a weapon.78  The court 
 
67 Id. at 1225-26. 
68 Id. at 1226. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that the police may conduct a search incident to arrest of 
the passenger compartment an arrestee’s vehicle, based on inherent exigencies of road-side 
encounters). 
72 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a search is not incident to arrest when the search is not 
promptly conducted after the arrest or no exigency exists at the subsequent search much later 
in time), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).  
73 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1126.  
74 Id. at 1226-28. 
75 Id. at 1226, 1227. 
76 Id. at 1227. 
77 Id. at 1226-27. 
78 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227-28. 
11
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pointed to the following facts in coming to its conclusion: a) at the time 
of the arrest, the defendant was holding onto the suitcase that the police 
searched, which made the contents of the suitcase “readily accessible” 
to him; b) the container “was of sufficient size to contain a weapon”; 
and c) the defendant had just committed a crime, and while the crime 
was not suggestive of the presence of a weapon, the fact that the 
defendant was wearing a bullet-proof vest certainly was, and was 
enhanced by the denial of that fact.79 
There was a flaw in the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
regarding its analysis.  In Smith, the court stated that:  
a container may not be searched for a weapon or 
evidence if it is apparent that it is so securely fastened 
that the person arrested cannot quickly reach its 
contents, or the person arrested makes unmistakably 
clear that he will not seek to reach the contents, or the 
container is so small that it could not contain a weapon 
or evidence of the crime.80 
These points have their flaws: first, the primary and secondary 
points create a spectrum that spans across a line segment.81  Under the 
first clause in the court’s rationale, where an arrestee has the bag so 
closely secured to his body, he demonstrates an inability to reach its 
contents.82  Thus, the arrestee could not realistically reach the evidence 
or weapon contained in the container because the way in which the 
container is situated on his person would prevent him from being able 
to.  An example of this may be a backpack because, logically, a person 
cannot reach into a backpack when it is behind them.  Additionally, the 
second clause states the opposite, in that if an arrestee has made 
“unmistakably clear” that he will not reach for the contents of the 
container, then he also demonstrates an inability to do so potentially.83  
An example of this may be that the arrestee tosses the bag away from 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1227.  
81 A line segment is a part of a line that is bounded by two distinct endpoints and contains 
every point along the segment found within the two end points.  Therefore, a line segment is 
the proper shape to describe anything along a spectrum because there are two extremes, and 
everything that falls in between is part of the spectrum, but everything outside of the extremes 
is not included. 
 
82 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227. 
83 Id. 
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himself prior to the arrest, but not in a way that constitutes an 
abandonment of the container.  Thus, in the same way that the bag can 
be so closely secured to a person that he cannot reach its contents, 
distance from the bag itself can also justify such a finding.  Therefore, 
a spectrum is created where both direct ends of the spectrum require 
the court to find the lack of exigent circumstances because the 
defendant cannot realistically reach the contents of the container at the 
time of the arrest, either near or far.84 
Second, the rationale used there is contradicted by other 
portions of the Smith opinion.85  If the language mentioned above is 
true, then how can the Court of Appeals say right before that “a search 
‘not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest’ may be 
conducted even though the arrested person has been subdued and his 
closed container is within the exclusive control of the police.”86  
Arguably, if a person is subdued by the police, then there is no way 
that he could acquire the contents of his bag, whether it is securely 
attached to himself or not.   
However, to say that the Smith opinion limited “exigent 
circumstances” only to situations where the police reasonably believe 
that the defendant may gain access to a weapon or may conceal or 
destroy evidence would be incorrect.  The Smith opinion did not 
explicitly hold that those were the only two examples of exigent 
circumstances that would justify such a search incident to arrest.  In 
fact, the court stated otherwise.  While the Smith court stated that “[a] 
person’s privacy interest in a closed container readily accessible to him 
may become subordinate to the need of the People, under exigent 
circumstances, to search it for weapons or evidence that otherwise 
might be secreted or destroyed,”87 it also said that  
[f]or compelling reasons, such as the safety of the 
officers or the public or to protect the person arrested 
from embarrassment, a search not significantly 
divorced in time or place from the arrest may be 
conducted even though the arrested person has been 
 
84 Id. (citation omitted) (“Whether the circumstances are such as to justify a warrantless 
search incident to arrest is to be determined . . . at the time of the arrest, but the justification 
does not necessarily dissipate with the making of the arrest.”).  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227.  
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subdued and his closed container is within the exclusive 
control of the police.88 
Thus, it would seem that the Court of Appeals did not attempt 
to limit itself to the exigencies that would justify a search incident to 
arrest under this new rule.  Possibly, the court could have believed that 
“hot pursuit” would also justify the search because “hot pursuit” is an 
exigent circumstance, but the court did not mention it.  Therefore, it 
would seem that Smith provided examples of exigencies, not 
limitations of them.  
B. People v. Gokey 
Five months after the Court of Appeals decided People v. 
Smith, it handed down People v. Gokey.89  In Gokey, the Court of 
Appeals dealt with the exigency issue, ultimately ruling that containers 
within an arrestee’s “grabbable area” may not be searched incident to 
arrest without such evident exigencies.90   
In Gokey, the police had received a tip that the defendant, 
Gokey, was travelling by bus with a duffel bag full of marijuana to 
Watertown, NY.91  The police arrived with an arrest warrant for an 
unrelated larceny charge for the defendant, and a dog trained to sniff 
for marijuana.92  The officers approached the defendant once he exited 
the bus, informed him that he was under arrest, and frisked him.93  
During the frisk, the police dog reacted to the duffel bag on the 
ground.94  After the defendant was handcuffed, the duffel bag was 
searched where eleven ounces of marijuana were discovered.95 
The Court of Appeals, in Gokey, provided an analysis that 
compared the federal standard regarding searches incident to arrest of 
containers to the New York standard.96  Under New York v. Belton, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that a police officer may 
conduct a search incident to arrest of any container within the 
 
88 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983). 
90 Id. at 724. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 724. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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“grabbable area” of the arrestee’s control.97  Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals conceded that, under the federal standard, the search incident 
to arrest of the defendant’s duffel bag would not have violated the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.98  However, the Court of Appeals 
chose not to follow the federal standard.99  Instead, the court held that 
the search of the container within the arrestee’s immediate area needed 
to satisfy two elements: first, the search of the container was made 
contemporaneously in time and location to the arrest; and second, the 
presence of exigent circumstances existed.100 
In Gokey, the court held that the search of Gokey’s bag was 
unconstitutional under the New York Constitution.101  The prosecution 
in the case had “concede[d] that in all frankness there was no 
immediate suspicion by the police officers that the defendant was in 
fact armed.”102  The police did not take the bag away from Gokey upon 
his arrest; in fact, they let Gokey keep the bag on the ground in between 
his legs while they conducted the frisk.103  At the time of the arrest, 
Gokey was handcuffed and surrounded by five police officers and a 
dog.104  This demonstrated that the police did not reasonably believe 
that he posed a danger to the arresting officers or the public because 
the only focus was whether the bag contained marijuana.  Additionally, 
the court found the fact that the prosecution did not assert that the 
officers reasonably believed that their search was justified to prevent 
the destruction of evidence dispositive to show the lack of exigency.105 
C. A Review of the Precedents 
After reviewing both Smith and Gokey, it should be clear that 
New York requires exigent circumstances for searches incident to 
lawful arrest of containers found within the controllable area.  
However, the two cases have created confusion for lower New York 
 
97 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-61 (1981) (relying primarily on Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
98 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 724.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 725. 
102 Id. 
103 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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courts.106  While Gokey is the leading New York precedent in this area, 
it seems that Smith is the more appropriate case law to follow for 
several reasons. 
First, as a policy consideration, Smith is congruent case law 
more in line with the Court’s reasoning in Robinson, in spite of Smith’s 
exigent circumstances requirement.  Both Robinson and Smith 
recognized the inherent exigencies that can come into play with regard 
to an arrest situation.  Smith took the extra step to say that there needs 
to be something more than probable cause to make an arrest in order 
to search the container; however, unlike Gokey, Smith did not go so far 
as to limit the several types of exigencies that would justify such a 
search.107  The reasoning behind this is that “exigent circumstances” 
are not limited only to instances that deal with evidence and danger, 
but can also include instances where the police have engaged in “hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon” and “the need to prevent a suspect’s 
escape.”108  Indeed, Smith stated that “protect[ing] the person arrested 
from embarrassment” is a “compelling reason” that would justify the 
search of a container incident to arrest, although the court did not 
provide an example of such embarrassment to illustrate what it 
meant.109   
Congruence with federal law is a goal that New York should 
aim to achieve.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals has addressed the need 
for uniformity with the Supreme Court in the past, with regard to 
Fourth Amendment cases.110  Additionally, even the concurrence in 
 
106 See, e.g., People v. Luna, 951 N.Y.S.2d 88, 2012 WL 1059392, at *8-11 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(reviewing the problems that Gokey has created within the New York Court system).  
107 Compare People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983) (“For compelling 
reasons, such as the safety of the officers or the public or to protect the person arrested from 
embarrassment, a search ‘not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest’ may be 
conducted even though the arrested person has been subdued and his closed container is within 
the exclusive control of the police.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)), with Gokey, 457 
N.E.2d at 724-25 (“When an individual subjected to arrest has a privacy interest in property 
within his or her immediate control or ‘grabbable area’, this court has identified two interests 
that may justify the warrantless search of that property incident to a lawful arrest: the safety 
of the public and the arresting officer; and the protection of evidence from destruction or 
concealment.” (citations omitted)). 
108 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).  
109 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227. 
110 People v. Ponder, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 1981) (“[S]ection 12 of article I of the 
New York Constitution conforms with the Fourth Amendment regarding the proscription 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and this identity of language supports a policy of 
uniformity in both State and Federal Courts.”).  While it is absolutely true that “[t]he state 
courts may experiment all they want with their own constitutions,” Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 
633, 641 (2016) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court), because New York has insisted that it should 
16
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Smith reasoned that the court should adopt a policy that is in 
conformity with Robinson.111  Judge Jasen stated that, other than the 
requirement that the search be conducted close in time and place to the 
arrest, there was no legitimate reason to depart from the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence on this issue.112  Judge Jasen also 
complained that the existence of the federal standard under Robinson 
and the new exigency requirement under Smith would create 
problems.113 
Second, Smith dealt with the issues that were contemplated in 
both of these cases and raised the exigency requirement sua sponte.114  
Because Smith was first to create the rule, the court in Smith had the 
ability to deliberate on what constituted exigent circumstances in the 
search incident to arrest context.  There, the Smith court mentioned that 
danger to the officer, loss or destruction of evidence, or other 
“compelling reasons” could justify the search.115  Therefore, Smith 
anticipated cases that would not fall neatly into the mold that it created, 
and yet there could be a situation that would justify the search.   
On the other hand, Gokey limited its analysis only as to whether 
the officer reasonably believed in the destruction of evidence because 
the government had conceded that the officers in Gokey did not fear 
for their safety.116  Furthermore, the government had not even asserted 
the presence of any exigency in the case at all, dooming its claim.117  
Based on the previous language in Smith, the court in Gokey limited its 
inquiry only to whether the police reasonably believed that the 
defendant was able to conceal or destroy evidence contained in the 
duffel bag, which it found lacking.118  Seemingly, Gokey presented a 
situation that was based on only part of the Smith rationale that came 
just months prior, and yet reached a drastically different conclusion 
 
adopt a policy of uniformity, such congruence with respect to the Fourth Amendment would 
seemingly not create a Tenth Amendment violation with regard to search and seizure 
jurisprudence. 
111 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1228 (Jasen, J., concurring). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1227 (relying on People v. De Santis, 385 N.E.2d 577, 580 (N.Y. 1978), abrogated 
by People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 422 & n.1 (1980) (holding that the police may conduct 
a search incident to arrest of a container found with the arrestee’s immediate control without 
requiring or finding exigency).  
115 Id.  
116 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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with regard to the same legal issue that would have the repercussion of 
having inconsistent results between similarly situated defendants.  
Finally, Smith is the more forgiving standard regarding 
searches incident to lawful arrest, recognizing that there are legitimate 
law enforcement reasons for allowing the search into the container.119  
For example, the temporal requirement, as stated in Gokey, is directly 
from the language in Smith that stated that the defendant could have 
gained access to the container “at the time of the arrest.”120  The critical 
inquiry is whether there was the existence of any set of “exigent 
circumstances” at the time of the arrest, and then whether the search 
was done contemporaneously with that arrest.121  However, the 
inherent exigencies of the arrest should be enough to justify the search.  
The Gokey view, based on the Smith language, is that there must be the 
existence of exigent circumstances after the arrest has been made.  
While this is in conformity with Smith, the Gokey limitation on what 
constitutes exigent circumstances is not. 
Therefore, Smith presents the more appropriate standard to 
follow with regard to searches incident to lawful arrest.  However, 
Gokey is the governing law regarding searches incident to lawful arrest 
of containers found within an arrestee’s controllable area.  Assuming 
that the rule in Gokey is correct and based on sound reasoning, the next 
Part will demonstrate the inconsistencies in how courts have applied 
the Gokey rule, which has become problematic.  
IV. GOKEY’S (MIS)APPLICATION IN PRACTICE 
Because Gokey was decided subsequent to Smith, the Court of 
Appeals may have effectively superseded Smith.  In the wake of Gokey, 
however, New York courts have been reaching inconsistent 
conclusions under Gokey.  Furthermore, while it would seem that 
Smith has been superseded, it has been consistently relied upon, 
together with Gokey, in these cases.  This Part will demonstrate the 
 
119 Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1227-28 (“Whether in fact defendant could have had access to the 
briefcase at the moment it was being searched is irrelevant.  He clearly could have had when 
arrested and neither the distance from nor the time elapsed since the arrest was sufficient to 
dissipate the reasonableness of conducting a search of the briefcase without a warrant.”). 
120 Id. at 1227, 1227-28.  
121 This view is shared by another scholar in the field of New York search and seizure law.  
See Jacqueline K. Iaquinta, Interpreting Search Incident To Arrest In New York: Past, Present, 
And Future, 30 TOURO L. REV. 1071, 1079 (2014).  
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inconsistencies between cases that either (a) apply a strict 
interpretation of Gokey or (b) apply a loose interpretation of Gokey.  
A. Strict Interpretation of Gokey 
Courts’ analyses that have applied a strict interpretation of 
Gokey122 are flawed because they do not appear to take anything into 
account that happened prior to the arrest to determine whether exigent 
circumstances at the time of the arrest existed.  These courts tend to 
focus on whether an officer testified as to their reasonable belief in 
such exigencies.  Finally, the courts that apply this interpretation tend 
to find that the evidence should have been suppressed.  
1. People v. Dougall 
In People v. Dougall,123 three officers were on patrol near 
Bryant Park in Manhattan when they noticed Dougall standing 
approximately one hundred feet away.124  The officers then observed 
Dougall contact two males, reach into his shoulder bag, and give them 
a manila envelope in exchange for money.125  The males took the 
envelope to a park bench, opened it, and began to roll what appeared 
to be a marijuana cigarette with the contents of the envelope.126  Then, 
the officers observed a third male approach Dougall, watched Dougall 
reach into his shoulder bag, and witnessed him perform the same 
transaction as before.127   
A police officer then approached Dougall, without his service 
weapon drawn.128  As he approached, a scuffle ensued between 
Dougall and the police officer, which caused the defendant’s bag to be 
thrown to the ground.129  After Dougall had been handcuffed, the police 
officer was joined by another officer, and all three began to leave the 
park, with one of the officers carrying the shoulder bag.130  As they 
were walking, the officer carrying the bag opened one of the 
compartments of the bag and found what appeared to be marijuana in 
 
122 See infra Part IV.A.1-6. 
123 481 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
124 Id at 278-79.  
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Dougall, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 279. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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different bags.131  After opening that compartment, the officer opened 
up another smaller compartment and found a small black revolver.132 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the issue presented 
was the following:  
At issue in the present case is the legal and New York 
Constitutional (Art. I, Sec. 12) validity of a Belton III 
warrantless search of personalty, absent an automobile, 
within the defendant’s reach (grab area) at the time of 
the arrest, when the search is made contemporaneously 
with the arrest but after the suspect and his property are 
in custody en route to the police station, and there is no 
threat to the officer’s safety or to the security of 
evidence, which has no nexus to the arrest.133 
When the issue is phrased as such, one can assume that the 
court would rule in favor of the defendant by the end of the hearing.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court of New York County found that the 
evidence collected from the bag needed to be suppressed because there 
was a lack of exigent circumstances based on the totality of the 
circumstances.134  The court made the following conclusions based on 
the totality of the circumstances: first, at the time of the search of the 
bag, “there was no reasonable possibility that the defendant would 
have been able to quickly reach and destroy the evidence therein”;135 
second, the searching officer did not reasonably expect to find a 
weapon for his interest was focused only on the marijuana in the bag; 
third, there was no apparent justification for the officers to fear for their 
safety at the time of the search.136  Therefore, the court suppressed the 
evidence.137 
The three conclusions that the Dougall decision rested on are 
flawed.  First, Smith explicitly rejects the “no reasonable possibility” 
standard that Dougall stated, even where, as in this case, the defendant 
was handcuffed and the bag was reduced to the exclusive control of 
the police.138  Smith states that there are circumstances in which a 
 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Dougall, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 279-80. 
134 Id. at 282.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983).  
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search such as this can be justified.139  Second, because of the 
combination of the scuffle between the defendant and the police officer 
with two previous sales for drugs by this defendant, the court should 
have found that the defendant reasonably could have been armed.  In 
2009, the Mexican Government reported that 90% of murders 
committed in Mexico were related to drugs.140  A study conducted in 
1994 found that, within Pittsburgh, PA, 80% of nineteen-year old 
people who sold hard drugs, such as cocaine, were found to also carry 
a gun.141  The Chicago police have told reporters as recently as this past 
February that 90% of gun violence and homicides in the city came 
from drug gangs.142   
If there is still the belief that drug crimes and gun violence are 
not interrelated in some way, then one need only look to the 
legislatures of some of the states, including New York, and the federal 
government to make a determination as to how interrelated the two 
really are based on the fact that they either treat the possession of a 
weapon while engaged in a drug offense as a separate crime entirely, 
or allow for an upward sentencing departure.143  Therefore, there is a 
significant probability that the defendant in Dougall may have had 
possession to a weapon because he had been involved in the sale of 
drugs and fought with the officer prior to his arrest. 
Finally, for the court to find that there is no reasonable belief 
that the officer’s safety was endangered when the officer had been 
involved in a fight with the defendant right after he sold drugs is 
absolutely preposterous because other New York courts have found 
that the fact that the defendant was handcuffed at the time of the search 
 
139 Id. 
140 Traci Carl, Progress in Mexico Drug War is Drenched in Blood, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE (Mar. 10, 2009, 1:28 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
sdut-lt-mexico-struggling-cartels-031009-2009mar10-story.html.  
141 Amanda Atkinson et al., Interpersonal Violence and Illicit Drugs, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
at 4, June 2009, http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/interpersonal 
_violence_and_illicit_drug_use.pdf.   
142 Stephen Changary, Drugs, Not Guns, Cause Gun Violence, DAILYADVANCE.COM (Feb. 
1, 2018), http://www.dailyadvance.com/Letters/2018/02 
/01/012918changarylet.html. 
143 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4.1 (West 2018); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.19 (McKinney 2018) (“A person is guilty of aggravated criminal 
possession of a weapon when he or she commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon 
in the second degree as defined in subdivision three of section 265.03 of this article and also 
commits . . . a drug trafficking felony as defined in subdivision twenty-one of section 10.00 
of this chapter arising out of the same criminal transaction.”). 
21
Knox: N.Y. Exigent Circumstances and Sila
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1292 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
does not completely eliminate the exigency.144  The Dougall opinion 
did not live without criticism from one New York trial court judge.  
Judge Leslie Snyder of New York County made it very clear that the 
decision in Gokey was not reflective of previous New York cases that 
had held that the search of a container incident to a lawful arrest was 
considered a de minimis intrusion where the ultimate intrusion, the 
arrest, had already occurred.145  “To illustrate the illogical result 
dictated by Gokey, see, People v. Dougall.”146 
2. People v. Thompson 
Tausheba Thompson was in Queens at nighttime when a 
detective observed him engage in a hand-to-hand sale of marijuana 
with an unknown man by removing a bag of marijuana from his pocket 
while wearing a backpack.147  The detective approached Thompson 
and asked him to remove the bag of marijuana from his pocket, which 
Thompson did.148  Thereafter, the detective attempted to arrest the 
defendant and asked him to remove his backpack from his back.149  
Suddenly, Thompson attempted to punch the detective in the face and 
fled from the detective.150  The detective gave chase and eventually 
caught up to Thompson by grabbing onto the backpack.151  When the 
detective grabbed the bag, he felt “an unidentifiable hard object” in the 
bag, but the detective let go of the bag because he was elbowed in the 
face by Thompson.152  The chase resumed with Thompson now 
 
144 Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1227-28; People v. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
1997), appeal denied, 694 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1998) (“Like Smith, the search in the present case 
occurred immediately after the defendant was arrested and handcuffed. Indeed, the search was 
conducted right there on the street, a short distance from the defendant.  Defendant easily could 
have reached for a weapon or attempted to rid himself of the money during the arrest itself, 
and the momentary delay in actually handcuffing defendant does not alter this result. 
Moreover, a determined arrestee may use means other than his hands—such as kicking or 
shoving the arresting officer—to disrupt the arrest process in order to gain a weapon or destroy 
evidence.  Such actions are a realistic possibility when the search occurs within close 
proximity to the arrest, as was the case here.”).  
145 People v. Montgomery, 489 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978-79 (Crim. Ct. 1985) (citing to People v. 
Perel, 315 N.E.2d 452 (N.Y. 1973) and People v. Weintraub, 320 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1974) for 
the position that New York follows the de minimis intrusion rationale).  
146 Id. at 979. 
147 People v. Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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carrying the backpack in front of him.153  Eventually, the detective 
caught up to Thompson again and the two fought over the bag, until it 
was released by both, and the chase resumed again.154  The detective 
caught Thompson a final time and was able to make the arrest, 
approximately thirty-six feet away from where the bag was located.155  
When the detective’s partner secured Thompson, the detective went 
back to the backpack, opened it, and found a loaded semi-automatic 
handgun.156   
The Appellate Division reversed Thompson’s conviction for 
possession of the weapon because the bag was not within Thompson’s 
area of immediate control at the time of the arrest, the detective did not 
assert that he searched the bag out of safety for himself, and the facts 
did not support a reasonable belief that the bag contained a weapon.157  
In addition, the Appellate Division reversed because the detective did 
not assert that he searched the backpack to protect against the 
destruction of evidence, and the facts did not support that belief.158  
The Appellate Division incorrectly found that there was a lack 
of exigent circumstances because the detective did not affirmatively 
testify as to his “reasonable belief.”  “While an officer need not 
affirmatively testify as to safety concerns to establish exigency, such 
apprehension must be objectively reasonable.”159  The facts that were 
known to the detective prior to the arrest include the following: (1) the 
detective had witnessed the defendant engaging in a hand-to-hand 
transaction of marijuana; (2) when the detective asked the defendant 
to remove the baggie that had contained the marijuana, the defendant 
complied; (3) when the detective informed the defendant that he was 
to be arrested and asked him to remove his backpack, the defendant 
fled; (4) when the detective initially grabbed the defendant’s bag, he 
felt “an unidentifiable hard object”; and (5) while giving chase in hot 
pursuit and getting elbowed in the face, the detective noticed the 
defendant repositioned the backpack so that it was in front of him.160 
Based on the flight of the defendant, the crime with which he 
was being arrested, the aggression of the defendant, and the 
 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted).  
158 Id. at 212. 
159 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 835.  
160 Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
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defendant’s action during the course of the chase, it is entirely 
reasonable to draw an inference that the defendant was hiding 
something in that bag, probably drugs.161  The defendant was ready to 
relinquish the drugs that the detective had observed him selling from 
his pocket arguably because the weight of the baggie was negligible 
for a significant drug charge; however, a backpack was large enough 
to conceal either a weapon or more drugs.  Indeed, when the defendant 
repositioned the bag to in front of himself, the contents of the bag 
became “readily accessible to him,” for which he could have discarded 
evidence during the course of the chase.162  Furthermore, the bag was 
of “sufficient size to contain a weapon.”163  This inference was 
strengthened by the fact that, during the course of the chase, the officer 
felt “an unidentifiable hard object” in the bag.164 
One may argue that because the bag was over thirty feet away 
at the time the defendant was handcuffed, the defendant could not have 
realistically gained access to anything in the bag.  This is valid 
criticism; however, one must remember the point at which the 
defendant is “under arrest.”  A seizure, including an arrest, occurs 
when a person reasonably believes that his freedom of movement has 
been curtailed.165  Therefore, the point at which Thompson was seized 
was when the officer informed him that he was under arrest because a 
reasonable person would understand that, at that point, he is not 
entitled to go anywhere else he wanted.  Indeed, Thompson’s freedom 
of movement was restricted to the area in which he ran: anywhere away 
from the officer.  Thus, the arrest had occurred prior to the point at 
which Thompson ran away, which means that the hot pursuit chase, 
the multiple scuffles, and the “unidentifiable hard object” were all facts 
that the detective was apprised of after the arrest had been made.  
Conclusively, this means that exigent circumstances existed after the 
arrest because the detective was running after the defendant in hot 
pursuit, the detective had witnessed the defendant dealing drugs, and 
he felt an unidentifiable hard object during the chase.  These facts, 
 
161 See People v. Garcia, 17 N.Y.S.3d 29 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015) (holding that a police 
officer was justified in searching arrestee’s backpack incident to arrest, even where the officer 
performing the search was not the initial police officer to observe the “suspicious exchange” 
between the arrestee and another person, and there was no aggression by the arrestee). 
162 See Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227. 
163 Id. 
164 Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
165 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959) (“When the officers interrupted the 
two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was 
complete.”); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968). 
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taken in their totality, would allow a reasonable inference that the 
defendant was either concealing evidence or in possession of a 
weapon.  
3. People v. Jimenez 
In People v. Jimenez,166 the police responded to a radio call 
about a burglary in progress at an apartment building that was 
participating in Operation Clean Halls, a program where police were 
authorized entry into privately owned buildings to conduct patrols.167  
The suspects that were identified in the radio call were two Latino 
males.168  At first, two officers arrived at the scene; shortly thereafter, 
four to six additional officers arrived to help with the investigation.169  
When the first two officers arrived, they noticed Jimenez, who was a 
Latina woman, and another Latino man exit the stairwell into the 
lobby.170  Behind Jimenez and the other man, the superintendent of the 
apartment complex was following them, pointing at them and 
“mak[ing] a face” that one of the officers understood as a request to 
stop them even though she never explicitly stated to do so.171  The 
officers moved the superintendent to the side “for safety reasons,” and 
then began questioning the defendant.172  At first, she told the officers 
that the two of them were in the building to visit a friend; however, she 
changed her story to say that she was in the building to find a notary.173  
Upon further questioning, she could not provide the names or 
apartment numbers of either the “friend” or the notary.174  
Additionally, there was a “No Trespassing” sign posted in the lobby.175 
At that point, the officers arrested the defendant for trespassing 
in the building.176  Prior to handcuffing, one of the officers went to 
remove Jimenez’s shoulder bag.177  Another officer stated that the bag 
 
166 8 N.E.3d 831 (N.Y. 2014). 
167 Id. at 833. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 834. 
177 Id. 
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she was holding “appeared to be heavy.”178  The officer removed the 
bag, opened it, and found a handgun that appeared to be loaded.179 
Jimenez was indicted for possession of a weapon in the second 
degree and criminal trespass in the first degree.180  Justice Darcel Clark 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence for safety 
concerns.181  She reasoned that the bag was not within the exclusive 
control of the police at the time of the arrest and that the 
superintendent’s gestures suggested that Jimenez and the other man 
were in the building in connection with the reported burglary.182  The 
defendant was tried and convicted on both counts.183 
The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously 
affirmed the trial court’s decision.184  The judges agreed that, at the 
time of the arrest, Jimenez’s shoulder bag had not been reduced to the 
exclusive control of the police, thus giving the defendant a potential 
opportunity to reach into the bag.185  Additionally, they reasoned that 
the bag was big enough to contain a weapon.186  Finally, they stated 
that the surrounding circumstances supported a reasonable belief that 
exigency was required in spite of neither officer testifying at the 
suppression hearing regarding their concern for safety.187 
The Court of Appeals, in a 4 to 3 decision, reversed the decision 
of the Appellate Division.188  Chief Judge Lippman, writing for the 
majority, stated that the People failed to meet their burden of proving 
exigency, in part, because neither officer testified at the suppression 
hearing regarding their reasonable belief for safety.189  However, the 
Court of Appeals held that “[w]hile an officer need not affirmatively 
testify as to safety concerns to establish exigency, such apprehension 
must be objectively reasonable.”190   
Then, the Court of Appeals analyzed each fact of the case and 
dissected them, piece-by-piece, and found that the search was 
 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 834. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 People v. Jimenez, 950 N.Y.S.2d 700, 700 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012).  
185 Id.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833, 836. 
189 Id. at 835. 
190 Id. 
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unreasonable.191  The court reasoned the following: (1) at the time of 
the search of the bag, there were between four and eight police officers; 
(2) there was no indication that either Jimenez or her partner was acting 
threateningly, and they complied with the police during the removal of 
the bag, the arrest, and the subsequent frisk; (3) the heaviness of a bag, 
on its own, is not enough to support a reasonable belief of a lack of 
safety or destruction of evidence; (4) the superintendent’s gestures, on 
their own, would also not provide a reasonable belief; (5) the fact that 
Jimenez and the other man were separated during the questioning by 
the officers, on its own, is not enough to establish a particularized 
suspicion of a person possessing a weapon; and (6) while the police 
were responding to a call about a burglary, there was no evidence to 
establish that either Jimenez or the other man was part of the burglary, 
putting aside their common ethnicity.192 
The problems with the court’s analysis in Jimenez are twofold.  
First, the court’s use of the number of officers to deal with possible 
safety concerns is a factor that should have been given less weight.  
Second, the court used a divide-and-conquer analysis when dealing 
with each fact in the analysis and failed to apply the totality of the 
circumstances to the situation and account for all of the facts.193 
Regarding the number-of-officers factor, there can be no doubt 
that multiple officers would arrive when there was a radio call about 
an ongoing burglary.  In 2008, the year that the Jimenez case began, 41 
police officers across the country lost their lives while in the line of 
duty to gunfire.194  In this particular case, the apartment complex that 
was entered into had been participating in Operation Clean Halls.195  
Operation Clean Halls is a program designed to allow the NYPD entry 
into the building, upon a request made by the landlord to the New York 
City Department of Housing and Development, so that the officers can 
stop and question people loitering in the building in an attempt to 
reduce the amount of drug dealing in these buildings.196  In all 
likelihood, the landlords contact the New York City Department of 
Housing and Development because they have a problem with drug 
 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 835-36. 
193 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 835-36. 
194 Honoring Officers Killed in 2008, OFFICER DOWN MEMORIAL PAGE, 
https://www.odmp.org/search/year?year=2008 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
195 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833. 
196 Operation Clean Halls Request, NYC.GOV, http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-
resources/service/2154/operation-clean-halls-request (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
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dealing going on in the building, establishing the belief that the 
building is located in a high-crime area.197 
The Jimenez officers’ apprehension of safety would logically 
be increased when they found Jimenez, in a high crime area, while 
responding to a call for a burglary.198  Furthermore, the superintendent 
of the building followed the defendant, while pointing at her, and 
making a face that the officers understood to mean “don’t let her get 
away.”199  Finally, the defendant lied to the officer about why she was 
there.200   
Additionally, where safety is concerned, the number of officers 
present at the scene will not reduce the number of bullets located in the 
magazine of Jimenez’s handgun.  While the number of officers is 
bound to have an impact on a suspect’s decision as to whether to use a 
weapon, the danger persists regardless and, therefore, that fact should 
be a minor factor in determining whether exigency exists.  At the time 
of the arrest, while there were potentially eight officers, the bag had 
not been reduced to the “exclusive control of the police,” as it was still 
in Jimenez’s possession because she had not yet been handcuffed.201  
Additionally, Jimenez’s bag “was of sufficient size to contain a 
weapon,”202 and one of the arresting officers testified that the bag 
“appeared to be heavy.”203  Therefore, Jimenez had the opportunity to 
reach into her big bag, while she was unhandcuffed, and reach for a 
weapon that the officers reasonably believed she might have 
possessed.  This leads to my next point.   
The court in Jimenez found it necessary to look at each of the 
facts in this case, in isolation of one another, and analyze them 
piecemeal before reaching its conclusions.204  The court’s divide-and-
conquer analysis of every fact in the case was the reason why it came 
to its conclusion.  The court found that the superintendent’s gestures, 
the heaviness and size of the bag, and the ethnicity of the defendant 
were not facts, standing alone, that would allow the court to find a 
reasonable belief for the threat to the safety of the officers on the 
 
197 Operation Clean Halls, LATINO USA (Apr. 5, 2012), https://latinousa.org/2012/ 
04/05/operation-clean-halls/.  
198 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 See People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983). 
202 Id. 
203 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 834. 
204 Id. at 835. 
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scene.205  Seemingly, the court provided a good faith, innocent 
reasoning to determine that the search was unreasonable based on all 
of the facts in the case.  However, this type of analysis is generally 
prohibited in the context of dealing with a Fourth Amendment claim.206  
“The totality-of-the-circumstances test ‘precludes this sort of divide-
and-conquer analysis.’”207 
In this case, the court possessed the following facts: (1) there 
was a call about a burglary in which two Latino males were involved; 
(2) the area where the burglary was reported was a high crime area, 
based on the apartment’s participating in Operation Clean Halls; (3) 
when the police entered the building, they noticed the defendant being 
followed by the superintendent of the building, who was pointing at 
her and making a face that the officer believed meant “don’t let her get 
away”; (4) when the officers began questioning about why she was 
there, she lied two times; (5) she was trespassing in the building, which 
was suspicious because the building was located in a high crime area; 
(6) she was carrying a bag that was sufficiently big to carry a weapon, 
and it appeared heavy; (7) while the defendant did not fit the 
description in the radio call, her partner may have; and (8) at the time 
of the arrest, Jimenez’s bag had not been reduced to the exclusive 
control of the police.208  Additionally, to take an extra precaution, the 
officers moved the superintendent to the side “for safety reasons.”209 
While it is true that each of these facts could be subject to a 
completely valid, innocent, good-faith rationale for its existence, taken 
in the collective, they represent an entirely different story.  The officers 
had probable cause to arrest the defendant for trespass.210  In addition 
 
205 Id. 
206 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where 
‘the facts and circumstances’ within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or being committed.” (citation 
omitted)); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 n.2 (2003); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 
138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) (“Our precedents recognize that the whole is often greater than the 
sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation.”); Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 
1226-27 (“We have interpreted the New York Constitution to require that the reasonableness 
of each search or seizure be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case.”). 
207 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting United States v. Arivizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).  
208 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833-34; but see People v. McPherson, 750 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2002) (holding that the search of an arrestee’s container was appropriate where 
the police had responded to an anonymous 911 call about a burglary and the container had not 
been reduced to the exclusive control of the police at the time of the search). 
209 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 833. 
210 Id. at 834. 
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to the crime of the arrest, “[e]xigency may also derive from 
circumstances other than the nature of the offense.”211  When taken in 
the totality of the circumstances, the facts in this case would give rise 
to a reasonable belief that the officers feared for the safety of 
themselves, or the superintendent.  Most strikingly, the court did not 
mention the fact that the defendant lied to the police in its analysis of 
the officer’s reasonable belief.  Nor did the court address the lack of 
“the exclusive control of the police” in the container at the time of the 
arrest.  Therefore, after reviewing the facts in the totality, there can be 
no question that the search of Jimenez’s bag in this case was 
reasonable. 
In the dissent, three judges criticized the majority for 
substituting its beliefs for the factual considerations that were made by 
both the trial court and the Appellate Division.212  While the dissent 
acknowledged that, at the time of the arrest, the police did not have 
probable cause to arrest the defendant for the burglary,213 the dissent 
pointed out that the officers had reason to believe that the defendant 
was involved with the burglary because of the actions of the 
superintendent following the defendants to the lobby.214  Additionally, 
the dissent reasoned that the case was more akin to Smith than to Gokey 
because the defendant lied to the police and the defendant’s bag was 
of sufficient size to contain a weapon.215  Moreover, the dissent 
distinguished Gokey because the government had not conceded the 
lack of exigent circumstances for the officers’ safety and the police in 
Jimenez did not allow the defendant to keep the container in their 
possession to search immediately.216  Finally, the dissent noted that the 
 
211 Id. at 835.  
212 Id. at 836 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting in part) (“Whether the police acted reasonably 
in conducting the warrantless search of defendant’s handbag involves ‘mixed questions of law 
and fact’ and our review is therefore ‘limited to whether there is record support for the 
determinations of the courts below.’  Contrary to the majority, I conclude that there is record 
support for the unanimous findings of the lower courts that the search here was reasonable 
under all of the circumstances.  Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.”); see People v. 
Carroll, 740 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that trial courts are entitled to wide 
discretion in their evidentiary determinations and that such determinations should not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion); People v. Prochilo, 363 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 
(N.Y. 1977) (“At the outset we observe that much weight must be accorded the determination 
of the suppression court with its peculiar advantages of having seen and heard the witnesses.”).  
213 Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d at 838. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 837. 
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number of officers would not have prevented the defendant from firing 
the weapon that she possessed at them.217 
I share the views of the Jimenez dissent and would have 
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. 
4. People v. M.R. 
On January 2, 2007, four police officers went to the defendant’s 
apartment to ask him questions about the shootings of the defendant’s 
two brothers a few days earlier.218  At the time that they visited the 
defendant, the police had not yet suspected that the defendant was, in 
fact, his own brothers’ shooter.219  They also did not confer with the 
detective tasked with investigating the shooting or the shooting 
victims.220  The defendant permitted the officers to enter his apartment, 
and the officers went to an L-shaped couch and a love seat where the 
defendant had his jacket.221  Four bags of marijuana were located near 
the jacket, and the police decided, at that point, to handcuff the 
defendant but not place him under arrest; they detained him in order to 
investigate further.222  After another search revealed marijuana in a 
bedroom, the defendant was moved away from the couch where he had 
initially been sitting, questioned by the police, and then allowed to sit 
on the love seat.223  Thereafter, one of the officers lifted the couch 
cushions of the love seat and found empty glassine envelopes.224 
The other officer made the following admissions in a court 
proceeding: (1) at the time that the defendant had been placed in 
handcuffs, the love seat was not within the defendant’s “lungeable” 
area; and (2) he had no idea why the first officer decided to lift the love 
seat cushions up.225  Furthermore, the officer never stated that he felt 
in danger during the investigation.226  When the first officer lifted 
another love seat cushion, he found a .357 caliber revolver, the 
defendant’s driver’s license and live ammunition for the gun.227 
 
217 Id. at 838. 
218 People v. M.R., 907 N.Y.S.2d 102, 2009 WL 5525297, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty 2009).  
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at *2, *5. 
222 Id. at *2. 
223 M.R., 2009 WL 5525297, at *3. 
224 Id. at *2-3. 
225 Id. at *2-4. 
226 Id. at *2, *3-4, *11. 
227 Id. at *4. 
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The Bronx County Supreme Court suppressed the gun 
reasoning that there was a lack of exigent circumstances because the 
officer never feared for their safety or the destruction of evidence.228  
While the officer testified that the handcuffs were only used to detain 
the defendant, the People conceded that the defendant was not free to 
leave at that point, and the court deemed that the defendant was 
arrested at that point, which meant that they could search the 
defendant’s person and the couch where the jacket had been located.229  
However, the court found that, based on the officer’s testimony, the 
love seat was not within the defendant’s area of immediate control.230  
The court’s conclusion in M.R. with respect to the “area of immediate 
control” is correct and, therefore, the gun, the driver’s license, and the 
ammunition should have been suppressed; however, the Gokey 
application, with regard to the temporal requirement, was incorrect.  
First, if the officer testified that the loveseat was not within the 
area of immediate control of the defendant at the time that he was 
arrested, then the search not only violates the defendant’s New York 
constitutional rights, but it also violates his federal constitutional 
rights.231  The search incident to arrest exception, as it relates to this 
Note, allows the police to search the person and the area within the 
arrestee’s immediate control and nothing more.  What then follows is 
that if the search is not of the person of the arrestee or of his area of 
immediate control after the arrest, then it cannot be justified as a search 
incident to arrest, under any law, absent a warrant or another exception.  
While the court in M.R. did address Chimel, it did so after a full-blown 
Gokey analysis.  However, if the search would not pass muster under 
Chimel, then there would be no need to address whether the search 
passes under state law because it already violated federal law.  
Second, the temporal requirement under Gokey was clearly not 
met in this case, but it was not addressed by the court.  Under Gokey, 
the search of the container must be done “contemporaneously with the 
arrest.”232  In Gokey, for example, when the defendant was under arrest, 
he was frisked, and the officers used a dog to sniff his bag for drugs.233  
Immediately after the dog reacted, the defendant was placed in 
 
228 M.R., 2009 WL 5525297, at *11.  
229 Id. at *10. 
230 Id. 
231 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
232 People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 725 (N.Y. 1983). 
233 Id. at 724. 
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handcuffs, and the police searched the bag.234  Because the court in 
Gokey never addressed the issue of whether the officer’s conduct there 
met the temporal requirement, it would seem that that the officers met 
the requirement because the only ground that the Gokey court reversed 
on was the lack of exigent circumstances.  Therefore, such a prompt 
search, as was performed in Gokey, will be used as the marker for 
determining the satisfaction of the “contemporaneous” prong. 
In M.R., the court mentioned the temporal requirement235 but 
did not address whether it was satisfied in this case.236  Here, the 
defendant was arrested and placed on a couch.237  Thereafter, one 
officer went to the bedroom and found more marijuana.238  When the 
officer emerged from the bedroom, the following occurred: (1) the 
officer noticed the defendant and another police officer having a 
conversation; (2) the officer asked the defendant if there was anything 
else in the apartment; (3) the defendant admitted that the marijuana in 
the bedroom was his; (4) the defendant’s girlfriend told the officer that 
the bedroom was her son’s; (5) the defendant was then allowed to 
smoke two cigarettes, one of which was done very quickly; (6) the 
defendant drank half a glass of water; and (7) the officer gave the 
defendant the option to sit on a living room chair or the love seat, and 
the defendant chose the latter.239  Prior to all of this occurring, neither 
the couch where the defendant’s jacket was nor the loveseat had been 
searched.  In total, the time between the officer emerging from the 
bedroom and discovering the handgun had been about three minutes, 
not including the time between when the defendant had been 
handcuffed before entry into the bedroom.240 
If the search in Gokey was contemporaneous, the search in 
M.R. was the opposite.  Unlike Gokey, the search in M.R. was not 
performed on the love seat until more than three minutes after the 
defendant had been arrested.  Arguably, the contemporaneous 
requirement must be read in conjunction with the exigency 
requirement because the fact that an officer would immediately search 
an object after an arrest lends credence to the belief that the officer may 
have believed there was something in the bag.  However, these 
 
234 Id. 
235 M.R., 2009 WL 5525297, at *10. 
236 Id. at *11. 
237 Id. at *2 (“The People concede that defendant was not free to leave at that point.”). 
238 Id. at *3. 
239 Id. 
240 M.R., 2009 WL 5525297 at *2-3, *4. 
33
Knox: N.Y. Exigent Circumstances and Sila
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1304 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
requirements are separate from one another.241  Therefore, it would 
appear that a search occurring three minutes after an arrest has been 
made is not a contemporaneous search, even if there had been the 
existence of exigent circumstances.  That being said, the substantive 
Gokey exigency analysis was not needed for two reasons, as stated 
above.  Thus, it would seem that the court in M.R. was correct but for 
the wrong reasons.  
5. People v. Morales 
At around 9:00 pm on February 29, 2008, two officers 
responded to a 911 call from someone about a suspicious man located 
in a restaurant.242  When the officers arrived, the restaurant owner 
greeted them outside and told them that the suspect appeared to be 
stealing from several women’s purses.243  The officers went inside the 
restaurant, asked the defendant to talk with them outside, and he did 
so.244  As the three were walking outside, the defendant turned around 
and jammed his hands into his jacket pockets.245  The officers 
attempted to remove the defendant’s hands from his pockets, and then 
a struggle ensued.246  The police eventually subdued and arrested the 
defendant by handcuffing him, and then moved him to the back of a 
police car.247  After the defendant had been moved to the car, the police 
searched his jacket, which had fallen off during the struggle, and found 
a box cutter knife and several envelopes containing drugs.248 
The New York County Supreme Court denied a motion to 
suppress the drugs that were found in the jacket, and the defendant was 
convicted at trial of criminal possession of a controlled substance in 
the fifth degree.249  The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed 
the trial court decision, finding that the evidence seized from the jacket 
 
241 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 724-25 (“Under the State Constitution, an individual’s right of 
privacy in his or her effects dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest be deemed 
unreasonable unless justified by the presence of exigent circumstances. . . . Moreover, the 
search must have been conducted contemporaneously with the arrest.”). 
242 People v. Morales, 2 N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Morales, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 474. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 477. 
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was not the product of a valid search incident to arrest.250  In coming 
to this conclusion, the court found that, at the time of the search, the 
defendant did not have access to the jacket because he was in a police 
car, thus negating any sense of exigency.251  This conclusion 
completely misreads both Smith and Gokey because the measurement 
of whether exigency existed is not determined at the time of the search 
but rather “[t]he reasonableness of a police officer’s assertion of either 
or both of these predicates to justify a warrantless search is measured 
at the time of the arrest.”252  
With that understanding, one must determine when the 
defendant was “arrested” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  That moment occurred after the defendant had jammed 
his hands into his pockets and the defendant engaged in a scuffle with 
the police.  Prior to that point, the police had received a 911 call about 
the defendant, the store owner pointed the defendant out when they 
arrived, and the defendant complied with the police request to go 
outside, all of which would lead to the belief that the police had 
“reasonable suspicion” prior to the defendant’s jamming his hands in 
his pocket.253  During the scuffle with police, that would be enough to 
give the police probable cause to make an arrest, and because 
defendant’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the defendant was 
seized, and was therefore “under arrest.”   
Moreover, the defendant was fighting with the police, and the 
jacket was still in his possession at that time, and not reduced to the 
exclusive control of the police.  Furthermore, because the defendant’s 
hands were in his pockets, the contents of his pockets were “readily 
accessible” to him.  Finally, because the restaurant owner believed that 
the defendant was stealing from women’s purses and the defendant 
jammed his hands in his pockets, an officer could reasonably believe 
 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 475.  In coming to this conclusion, the Morales court relied on the following cases: 
People v. Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014); People v. Diaz, 966 
N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) (holding that the search of a backpack was unlawful 
where the defendant was handcuffed at the time of the search and the bag was no longer in his 
control); People v. Julio, 666 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997).  
252 People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 725 (N.Y. 1983) (emphasis added); People v. Smith, 
452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227-28 (N.Y. 1983) (“Whether in fact defendant could have had access to 
the briefcase at the moment it was being searched is irrelevant. He clearly could have had 
when arrested and neither the distance from nor the time elapsed since the arrest was sufficient 
to dissipate the reasonableness of conducting a search of the briefcase without a warrant.” 
(emphasis added)).  
253 Morales, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 474.  
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that the defendant was possibly attempting to destroy evidence related 
to that crime,254 and the officer did not even have to affirmatively 
testify to that.255 
6. Summary of Strict Interpretation Cases 
Dougall, Thompson, Jimenez, M.R. and Morales present a 
sample of cases where New York courts have applied a strict 
interpretation of Gokey, leading to results that conflict with the 
underlying justification for searches incident to arrest.  These cases 
clearly demonstrate the difficulty in application that Gokey has set 
forth for the trial courts and the problems that the rules of law have 
created for subsequent Appellate Division and Court of Appeals 
decisions.  However, some of the following cases have established that 
reviewing courts give a rather loose reading of Gokey in denying a 
defendant’s motion to suppress in similar circumstances as in the 
above cases. 
B. Loose Interpretation of Gokey 
Courts that have applied a loose interpretation of the Gokey 
rule256 seem to rely less on Gokey and more on Smith.  Additionally, 
these courts tend to either (1) infer that exigent circumstances existed 
based on the facts of the case, or (2) not mention exigency at all.  
Finally, these courts are more willing to deny motions to suppress in 
cases concerning searches incident to arrest where the search of the 
container was done immediately after the arrest had been made. 
1. People v. Wylie 
On February 20, 1996, a police officer was assigned to 
investigate a robbery of a “Love Store” employee who had been 
bringing the proceeds of the Love Store’s business to the bank.257  The 
robber was described as a six foot tall, black male with a goatee, 
weighing between 230 and 250 pounds, and wearing a black or tan 
 
254 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 724. 
255 People v. Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d 831, 835 (N.Y. 2014). 
256 See infra Part IV.B.1-5. 
257 People v. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1-2 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997), leave to appeal denied, 
694 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1998). 
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jacket.258  The robber also had possession of the bag in which the 
proceeds had been kept—the brown bag with the money was located 
inside  a Love Store bag, which was contained inside a Gap bag.259  No 
one at the bank saw the robbery.260  Furthermore, the robbery victim 
showed no signs of being hurt from the robbery, in spite of the fact that 
he said he had been hit in the face.261  Additionally, the victim had 
given conflicting descriptions to other police officers.262  Eventually, 
the victim confessed that the robbery was a “phony robbery” and that 
he had been working with a man by the name of “Paul,” who worked 
at a local jewelry store.263 
With the new information they had acquired about Paul, the 
police went to Paul’s residence and waited for him to show up.264  
When a man meeting Paul’s description approached, the police left 
their vehicle and approached him.265  After confirming that the person 
they found was the Paul they were looking for, the police officers 
arrested him and handcuffed him.266  A search of his right coat pocket 
revealed a plastic bag with the Love Store logo, and inside there were 
two bundles of $3,000 each.267 
The trial court found that the money in the bag should have 
been suppressed because the police had an obligation to secure a 
warrant to search the closed bag after the defendant had been 
handcuffed.268  Furthermore, the trial court also reasoned that Gokey 
controlled, the search was not justified to prevent the destruction of 
evidence, and the search was not based on a reasonable belief that the 
defendant had a weapon in the bag.269 
The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously 
disagreed with the suppression ruling and reversed.270  The court in 
Wylie explained that the search incident to arrest exception was based 
on the need to protect the arresting officer by permitting him “to search 
 
258 Id. at 2. 
259 Id.  
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 2. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 2. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 3. 
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for and seize weapons when there is reason to fear for his safety and in 
preventing the person arrested from destroying evidence of criminal 
involvement by permitting the arresting officer to search for and seize 
such evidence.”271  The court also recognized that “[a]nother 
consideration underlying this exception is that since the arrest itself 
constitute[d] such a major intrusion on an individual’s privacy, ‘the 
encroachment caused by a contemporaneous search of the arrestee and 
his possessions at hand is in reality de minimis.’”272  
This rationale conflicts with Gokey because the de minimis 
rationale is rejected by the Court of Appeals, which recognizes rather 
that “[u]nder the State Constitution, an individual’s right of privacy in 
his or her effects dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest be 
deemed unreasonable unless justified by the presence of exigent 
circumstances.”273  Therefore, the de minimis rationale is at odds with 
a New York citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy as protected 
by Gokey and its progeny.274 
Furthermore, the court in Wylie found that the bag had not been 
reduced to the exclusive control of the police because it failed to meet 
the “test for exclusive control, as defined . . . by the Court of 
Appeals.”275  Then, the court in Wylie stated:  
Like Smith, the search in the present case occurred 
immediately after the defendant was arrested and 
handcuffed. Indeed, the search was conducted right 
there on the street, a short distance from the defendant. 
Defendant easily could have reached for a weapon or 
attempted to rid himself of the money during the arrest 
itself, and the momentary delay in actually handcuffing 
defendant does not alter this result. Moreover, a 
determined arrestee may use means other than his 
hands—such as kicking or shoving the arresting 
officer—to disrupt the arrest process in order to gain a 
weapon or destroy evidence. Such actions are a realistic 
possibility when the search occurs within close 
proximity to the arrest, as was the case here. In any 
 
271 Id. (citing People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746-47 (N.Y. 1982)). 
272 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 3 (quoting People v. De Santis, 385 N.E.2d 577, 579 (N.Y. 
1978)).  
273 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 724.  
274 Id. 
275 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4. 
38
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/18
2018 N.Y. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND SILA 1309 
event, the factual scenario in this case is a far cry from 
the police-controlled arrest scenes in Chadwick and 
Gokey, where no interpretation of the evidence would 
permit a finding of exigent circumstances.276 
While the conclusion of the court in Wylie was correct, it does 
not comport with Gokey.  New York courts have held that handcuffing 
a defendant can, in some instances, eliminate any reasonable inference 
of exigent circumstances.277  Under the traditional Gokey view, the 
police would have been entitled to seize the Love Store bag but not 
search it without a warrant because the defendant had been handcuffed, 
and the bag had been removed from his jacket, which put it in the 
exclusive control of the police and removed the exigency.  However, 
the court in Wylie invented the “determined arrestee” and allowed for 
the possibility of kicking or shoving, maybe even biting, to justify why 
a search that is done right after an arrest had been made is justified and 
some leniency is granted in such case.  To this day, Wylie is still the 
only Appellate Division case in New York that mentions “a determined 
arrestee” when performing an exigency analysis. 
2. People v. Doe 
Similar to Thompson,278 People v. Doe279 involved the search 
of a bag after the defendant had taken flight from the police officer.280  
A police officer witnessed the defendant exchange a small package that 
he pulled from a pack on his waist for money.281  Thereafter, the officer 
yelled “police,” and the defendant fled into an abandoned building.282  
The officer eventually subdued and arrested the defendant, removed 
the defendant from the building, and then checked the pack on his 
waist, in which he found narcotics.283 
 
276 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  
277 People v. Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995) (“Once the 
defendant was under arrest and the change purse was safely in the possession of the arresting 
officer, there was absolutely no reason why a warrant for a search of the purse’s contents could 
not have been obtained if there had in fact been any basis to suppose that the purse contained 
either contraband or evidence of the crime for which the arrest had been made.”). 
278 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
279 711 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000). 
280 Id. at 1. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
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The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction.284  The court held that the search 
was justified because “the situation was volatile in that [the] defendant 
had been subdued after a struggle [with police].”285  The Appellate 
Division made no direct mention of exigent circumstances, or whether 
the police officer reasonably believed in them at the time.  
Furthermore, the Appellate Division relied on De Santis286 and Wylie 
in coming to its conclusion; it did not cite to Gokey, nor did it mention 
exigent circumstances.287 
Because this was a search incident to arrest of a container found 
within the controllable area of the arrestee, Gokey controlled.288  
Additionally, this case presented similarities to Thompson, where a 
defendant fled after the police had approached him for drug sale and 
the situation became volatile.  However, the Appellate Division in Doe 
chose not to rely on Gokey as the controlling precedent but rather chose 
to follow Wylie and De Santis.289  Under this rationale, the Appellate 
Division eschewed the exigent circumstances requirement and 
seemingly reasoned that the search was proper because it was a de 
minimis intrusion.  Furthermore, the rationale may have considered 
Wylie’s “determined arrestee” because there was a struggle.  Be that as 
it may, Gokey requires the existence of exigent circumstances to justify 
a search of a container in the area of immediate control.290  Because 
the Appellate Division in Doe chose not to rely on Gokey explicitly, it 
seems as though it implicitly recognized that the struggle that occurred 
was an exigent circumstance and would justify the search of the pack 
on the defendant.  
3. People v. Jones 
In a case somewhat analogous to Jimenez, the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, dealt with a case where a defendant was 
trespassing and lied about why he was present.  In People v. Jones,291 
an employee of a private residential facility noticed that the defendant 
 
284 Doe, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7147, at *1. 
285 Id. 
286 People v. De Santis, 385 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y.1978).  
287 Doe, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. 7147, at *1-2. 
288 People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724 (N.Y. 1983).  
289 Doe, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. 7147, at *2. 
290 Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d at 311. 
291 523 N.Y.S.2d 187 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1987). 
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was in the lobby of the facility at approximately 7:00 pm.292  The 
building had a sign-in procedure for visitors coming to the building.293  
An employee asked the defendant why he was in the building, to which 
he responded that he was there to visit a friend.294  After the employee 
reported the defendant’s presence to her supervisor, she returned to the 
lobby, but the defendant was no longer there.295  Sometime later, the 
supervisor found the defendant lying face down on the basement floor, 
partially in the employee’s locker room.296   
Upon seeing the supervisor, the defendant got up and entered 
the locker room, so the supervisor called the police.297  When the police 
arrived, they were notified by the dining room attendant that the 
defendant had just left through the back door.298  The police found the 
defendant outside and questioned him as to why he was there, to which 
he responded that he was looking for the bathroom and showed the 
police a social services card bearing his name and photograph.299  The 
police asked him to return with them to the lobby, which he agreed to, 
and he was identified by the original employee and the supervisor, the 
latter of whom requested that the police arrest the defendant for 
trespassing.300  The defendant was arrested and given Miranda 
warnings.301  Then, the police requested identification from the 
defendant, pointing to a wallet hanging out of the defendant’s jacket.302  
The defendant stated that the wallet was not his.303  The police took the 
wallet, opened it up, and found information that indicated the wallet 
belonged to an employee of the facility.304 
The defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree, 
grand larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen 
property in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in 
 
292 Id. at 188. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Jones, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 188. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id.  
300 Id. 
301 Jones, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 188. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
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the fourth degree.305  The defendant pled guilty to the burglary 
charge.306   
In justifying the arrest of the defendant, the Appellate Division, 
Third Department, pointed to the following facts: (1) the facility where 
the defendant was located had a strict sign-in policy; (2) the 
defendant’s inconsistent answers with regard to his presence in the 
building; (3) the defendant’s presence in the locker room, which was a 
non-public area of the building; (4) the complaining witness’s 
presumptively reliable statements to the police; and (5) the subsequent 
identification.307  Because of these facts, the Appellate Division found 
that the defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause.308 
As to the question of whether the wallet was properly seized, 
the Appellate Division found that the defendant was arrested based on 
reasonable cause.309  Based on the fact that the arrest was based on 
reasonable cause, the Appellate Division found that the search of the 
person was reasonable as well.310  The Appellate Division did not cite 
 
305 Id. 
306 Jones, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 188. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Id.  Under New York law, “reasonable cause” and “probable cause” are terms of art 
utilized in making a determination as to whether the police officer has enough information in 
front of him or her to warrant an objective person in reasonably believing that a crime has been 
committed, and thus the terms are used interchangeably on occasion by the courts, as was done 
here.  See id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 2018) (“‘Reasonable cause to 
believe that a person has committed an offense’ exists when evidence or information which 
appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and 
persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that 
it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it.”); 
Id. § 140.10(1)(a) (“Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, a police officer may arrest a 
person for: (a) Any offense when he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person 
has committed such offense in his or her presence.”); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964) (“Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the 
moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that 
moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”). 
310 Jones, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 188. 
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to Gokey, nor did it mention exigent circumstances.  Rather, it cited to 
People v. Marsh311 and New York v. Belton.312 
The Appellate Division, Third Department’s analysis of the 
search was flawed because it made no mention of the appropriate 
standard under Gokey.  While the wallet was technically an object 
found on the person of the arrestee, the wallet, itself, was a container, 
which meant that it was governed by Chimel, Gokey and their progeny.  
In fact, the Appellate Division implicitly recognized that by citing to 
Marsh and Belton.313  The problem is that both of those cases involved 
the search incident to an arrest exception with regard to vehicles, 
whereas this case dealt with an on-the-street encounter that had a 
search incident to arrest of a container, a wallet.  Therefore, Gokey was 
the controlling, on-point case law.  As such, the police needed to have 
exigent circumstances at the time of the arrest to search the defendant’s 
person. 
In Jones, the defendant was arrested for trespassing in a private 
building, but the facts and circumstances of the case would not lead a 
police officer to reasonably believe that the defendant possessed a 
weapon that could hurt the officers.  Moreover, the wallet was in the 
possession of the arrestee, but the arrestee himself had been reduced to 
the exclusive control of the police after his arrest.  As a result, there 
could have been no reasonable belief on the part of the officers to 
believe that the defendant would have been able to conceal the wallet 
that the officers had directly pointed out to the defendant prior to the 
search.  However, the Appellate Division found the opposite: 
regardless of exigent circumstances, the search was valid.314  
Seemingly, this search would have been suppressed under Gokey. 
 
 
 
 
311 228 N.E.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that the legislature of New York would not 
have intended the search incident arrest exception to the warrant requirement to extend to 
arrests made specifically for traffic violations where Vehicle Traffic Law § 155 provides that 
“[a] traffic infraction is not a crime and the punishment imposed therefor shall not be deemed 
for any purpose penal or criminal punishment and shall not affect or impair the credibility as 
a witness or otherwise  of any person convicted thereof.”). 
312 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that the police may conduct a search incident to arrest of 
the passenger compartment an arrestee’s vehicle, based on inherent exigencies of road-side 
encounters). 
313 Jones, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89. 
314 Id. at 188. 
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4. People v. Watkins, People v. Baker, and 
People v. Thompson 
In People v. Watkins,315 the Appellate Division, First 
Department, held that a search incident to arrest of a defendant’s bag 
was proper because the search had been done close in time and location 
to the arrest where the defendant had been handcuffed, the bag had not 
been reduced to the exclusive control of the police, and exigent 
circumstances were “readily inferable” from the officer’s testimony.316  
The problem is that the court found that the circumstances were 
“readily inferable” more than 15 years before the court in Jimenez 
reasoned that an officer need not affirmatively testify to his belief.317  
Seemingly, Watkins is analogous to Jimenez in that the bags had not 
been reduced to the exclusive control of the police and that the exigent 
circumstances were “readily inferable.”  Unlike Watkins however, 
Jimenez was not handcuffed at the time of her search.  Be that as it 
may, the two cases have inconsistent results. 
In People v. Baker,318 the Appellate Division, First Department, 
unanimously affirmed a trial court’s ruling to deny a motion to 
suppress, basing its conclusion on the fact that the drugs contained in 
the bag found during a search that had been conducted right after an 
arrest had been made.319  The court in Baker made no mention in its 
opinion about the existence of exigent circumstances, nor did it speak 
to whether the container was within the exclusive control of the police. 
In People v. Thompson,320 the Appellate Division, First 
Department, unanimously found that the search of a cigarette box had 
been done immediately after the defendant had been arrested, and that 
“the record” revealed the existence of exigent circumstances.321  The 
court in Thompson gave no indication about how the record established 
exigency. 
 
315 682 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1998), leave to appeal denied, 710 N.E.2d 1105 
(N.Y. 1999).  
316 Id. 
317 Cf. People v. Thompson, 988 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014) (holding that 
evidence should be suppressed when an officer did not testify to his reasonable belief and the 
facts did not support such a belief). 
318 679 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998), leave to appeal denied, 708 N.E.2d 182 
(N.Y. 1999). 
319 Id. 
320 703 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t), leave to appeal denied, 733 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 
2000).  
321 Id. 
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5. Summary of Loose Interpretation Case 
A common theme in most of these cases is that all of them cite 
to Smith or Wylie for the authority to justify the search, and none of 
them cite to Gokey.322  Under a Smith or Wylie approach, it would seem 
that the police are given more deference in their actions at the time of 
the arrest.  However, these cases conflict with Gokey because they tend 
to find exigent circumstances more easily than cases that apply Gokey 
strictly.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The inconsistencies, both found in cases where evidence has 
been suppressed and cases where it has not, have proven to create 
significant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence flaws within New York.  
Where the Courts of New York have inconsistently applied the Gokey 
rule, the Court of Appeals should review these cases to address these 
inconsistences and correct them.  Alas, given that Jimenez was the 
most recent Court of Appeals decision on the issue of searches incident 
to arrest of containers found within the controllable area of an arrestee, 
it is unlikely that change is on the horizon.  Borrowing the words of 
Judge Gabrielli in his People v. Belton323 concurrence, “[t]he majority, 
by its decision to reject the theoretical underpinnings of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in this case, leaves the citizens and law enforcement 
officials of New York in a state of continued confusion.”324 
As a policy consideration, the proper course for the New York 
courts would be to adopt a precedent of uniformity with regard to the 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because both article I, 
section 12, of the New York Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution share identical language.  Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals has addressed the need for uniformity with the 
Supreme Court in the past with regard to Fourth Amendment cases.325  
In line with the Court of Appeals language in Ponder, the Court of 
Appeals should follow the rules created in Chimel and Robinson, with 
regard to searches incident to arrest, and eschew the rule created by 
Gokey. 
 
322 See People v. Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d 40, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13778, at *1 (1st 
Dept. 1998); Baker, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 107; Thompson, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 173.  
323 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982) (Belton II). 
324 Id. at 749 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). 
325 People v. Ponder, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 1981). 
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Continuance with Gokey creates confusion in the realm of 
search and seizure jurisprudence for New York law enforcement 
officials dealing with on-the-street encounters.  While a defendant 
being handcuffed is strong evidence that he will not be able to get into 
a container that he possesses,326 the police may still search his 
container.327  As mentioned in Smith, if the bag is too tightly attached 
to defendant so as to prevent him from “quickly” reaching it, the 
evidence collected therefrom can be suppressed.328  Worst of all is that 
the Court of Appeals understands that these searches, if reviewed in a 
federal court, would be sustained.329   
In her Jimenez dissent, the late Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam 
criticized the Court of Appeals for supplanting its reasonable 
inferences of the case for the reasonable inferences that had been found 
by both Justice Clark at the Supreme Court level and the Appellate 
Division, First Department.330  She wrote: 
This is not an instance where, even accepting the 
entirety of the hearing court’s factual findings, none of 
the inferences that reasonably may be drawn from [the] 
settled facts can support the conclusion that [the search] 
was lawful. Rather, the facts do support the inferences 
reached by the lower courts, although other inferences 
could also be reached, as demonstrated by the 
conclusions drawn by the majority. For example, the 
majority notes that the police need not affirmatively 
testify that they were concerned about their safety, but 
that the apprehension of the police must be objectively 
reasonable. In concluding that there was nothing 
connecting defendant or her companion to the burglary, 
the majority downplays the uncontroverted testimony 
that when the police officers first entered the lobby, 
they were directed to defendant by the gestures of the 
superintendent, who motioned to the police to stop 
defendant and her companion.331 
 
326 See People v. Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995). 
327 See People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983). 
328 Id. 
329 People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724 (N.Y. 1983).  
330 People v. Jimenez, 8 N.E.3d 831, 837-38 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).  
331 Id. (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 
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The main issue with the opinion in Jimenez is the flagrant 
disregard of the inferences drawn by both the trial court and the 
Appellate Division, both of which utilized the Gokey opinion in their 
rationales but came to opposite conclusions from the Court of Appeals.  
In addition, the precedent of a “divide-and-conquer” analysis will only 
allow judges who have personal disagreements with the case to find a 
way to impose their personal beliefs rather than the rule of law and 
facts in making determinations.  Judicial activism, on this level, 
presents issues in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for law 
enforcement officials, the likes of which the officials will not be 
apprised at the time that they do their job, and only realized years later. 
Ten years ago, in People v. Hall,332 Judge Ciparick 
distinguished body cavity searches from the traditional search incident 
to arrest rationale, stating that the latter searches “are permitted 
because they represent de minimis intrusions when compared with the 
loss of liberty occasioned by the arrest that preceded them.”333  The 
Appellate Division, Second Department, once stated that a seizure of 
a defendant’s bag was justified, where it was located ten feet away 
from him at the time of the arrest, because “the seizure . . . did not 
invade his expectation any more than the arrest itself.”334  That same 
court found that the search of the same bag was justified because the 
search was “not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest”; 
no exigent circumstances were mentioned.335  Thus, it is apparent that 
New York recognizes the de minimis intrusion rationale as a legitimate 
basis for eschewing a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
containers; however, it would seem that the rationale is inconsistently 
applied. 
Robinson presents the clear, straightforward answer to searches 
incident to arrest.  If Robinson is unavailable, however, then Smith 
should govern rather than Gokey.  But, because of the questions Gokey 
left unanswered, New York courts have been left to fill in the blanks, 
coming to conclusions that leave similarly situated defendants in 
completely different places within the law.  In 1981, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
 
332 886 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2008). 
333 Id. at 174 (Ciparick, J., concurring). 
334 People v. Thomas, 738 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002). 
335 Id. 
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Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is primarily intended 
to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and 
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily 
applicable . . . . A highly sophisticated set of rules, 
qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring 
the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, 
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile 
minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may 
be literally impossible of application by the officer in 
the field.336 
No one could have said it better. 
 
 
336 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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